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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff Appellee 
vs. 
GREGORY L. PRESTWICH 
Defendant/Appellant 
CaseNo.20060323-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of distribution of a controlled substance in a drug-
free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West 2004), 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, the Honorable G. Michael 
Westfall presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the entry of a confidential informant whom defendant invited into his home 
violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision on the constitutionality of a search or 
seizure is a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 12, 103 P.3d 
699. This Court review the trial court's legal conclusions non-deferentially for correctness. 
State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, \ 9,125 P.3d 938. This non-deferential review extends to the 
trial court's application of the law to the underlying facts. Brake, 2004 UT 95 at \ 15. 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to find entrapment as a matter of law where the 
evidence conflicted regarding the circumstances surrounding the sale? 
Standard of Review: Entrapment presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 
Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). This Court reviews the legal conclusions for 
correctness and the factual findings for clear error. State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ^ j 7, 
121 P.3d 342, cert granted, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005). Also, "[d]ue to the factually sensitive 
nature of entrapment cases[,] [this Court] will affirm . . . 'unless [it] can hold, based on the 
given facts, that reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether entrapment occurred.' Only 
when reasonable minds could not differ can [this Court] find entrapment as a matter of law." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE 
The following are attached at Addendum A: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a controlled buy, the State charged defendant with distribution of marijuana 
in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony. (R. 3-2). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion 
to suppress the marijuana he sold to a police informant whom he invited into his home. (R. 
45-42). At the suppression hearing, defendant raised both Fourth Amendment and 
2 
entrapment issues. (R. 201:3). The trial court denied the motion to suppress and refused to 
find entrapment as a matter of law because a "substantial difference" in the testimony 
properly belonged to a jury to resolve. (R. 62-53, 65-64, 201:89). defendant 
received the instruction he requested on entrapment, verbatim. (R. 109,133). Thejuryfound 
defendant guilty as charged. (R. 100-99). The court sentenced defendant to 1-15 years, with 
all but 150 days suspended, and placed defendant on probation for 36 months. fR ' -74, 
182-77). Defendant timely appealed. (R. 193-92). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Entr . You allowed [Jamie, the confidential informant] to come in; is that correct? 
A [Defendant]: . . . [Y]es. (R. 201:64). 
Entrapment Q: Did you say anything or do anything that you felt) oil n m l n l i ' In 
to entice him to agree to sell you the marijuana? 
A [Jamie]: Just asked him for it. (R. 201:30). 
Testiiiiifi" 111" 11 s u1111"iv\s it 11 i li t"111ing 
In June 2004, Jamie Oden agreed to help the Iron Garfield Counties Narcotics Task 
Force bring charges against four or five drug operatives in exchange for its recommendation 
that her probation violation on a conviction for possession of methamphetamine be dropped. 
(R. 201:9-10,14,33). Jamie had worked with the task force successful I\ DIM \ trior occasion. 
(R. 201:42). She was desperate not to go to prison and lose her son. (R. 201:14, 16-18). 
Jamie suggested that she could get marijuana from defendant. (R. 201:10, 34). 
Jamie had known defendant for about five years and considered herself his 
"acquaintance." (R. 201:7-8). She and a friend would go to defendant's apartment ami 
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smoke marijuana with him. (R. 201:18-19). By July 2004, however, she and defendant 
"hardly ever talked," and she would only say "hi" to him in passing. (R.201:8). 
On July 14,2004, Officer Kimberly Riddle fitted Jamie with a wire, searched her and 
found her drug-free, and drove her to defendant's home at the Eden Apartments in Cedar 
City. (R. 201:7, 11, 27-29, 35-36). Officer Riddle also gave Jamie task force buy money. 
(R. 201:29). When Jamie knocked at defendant's door, she asked him if she could come in, 
and defendant answered, "Yes." (R. 201:25). When Jamie asked if she could buy some 
marijauna, defendant "thought for a second and then he said,' Yeah." (R. 201:12,21). Then 
Jamie walked into the apartment. (R. 201:21). Defendant sold her a pre-weighed one-eighth-
ounce bag of marijuana for twenty-five dollars. (R. 201:12-13, 30). She neither said or did 
anything to entice defendant to sell her the marijuana—she "[j]ust asked him for it." (R. 
201:23). Jamie was in defendant's apartment for about five minutes. (R. 201:30). 
During the controlled buy, several members of the task force maintained surveillance 
of the apartment complex. (R. 201:35). No officers entered defendant's apartment. (R. 
201:36-37). Officer Tony Gower monitored the conversation and took notes as he listened. 
(R. 201:36). Upon returning to Officer Riddle's car, Officer Riddle searched Jamie again, 
took the unspent money and the drugs, and removed the wire. Id. Jamie told her that she had 
purchased the marijuana from defendant. (R. 201:30). 
Defendant testified. (R. 201:47-66). He agreed with Jamie that he had probably 
smoked marijuana with her at least twenty times, although he claimed to have supplied the 
drug only about five of those times. (R. 201:48-49, 56). She had repeatedly asked him to sell 
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her some marijuana for a couple of weeks before July 14, so he was prepared for her when 
she arrived thai da). i R. 201:49-51). By then, he no longer wanted to have anything to do 
with her—"Our friendship, as far as I was concerned, was gone." (R. 201:50). Nevertheless, 
out of their past friendship, defendant agreed to sell Jamie the marijuana. (R. 201:51). 
When Jamie appeared on July 14, she begged him for the marijuana, saying, "Please, please, 
please, Fm desperate." (R. 201 :o( I) When he opened the door, he allowed her to enter and 
remain within. (R. 201:53-54, 64). 
On redirect examination, Jamie testified that she had talked to defendant only twice 
in the two weeks before July 14. (R. 201:67). She did not threaten defendant or beg him for 
marijuana, which she had bought from him at least once before. (R. 201:68-69). 
The task force did not arrest defendant until September 17,2004, because they di*11«"' 
want to compromise Jamie as she continued to work for them. (R. 201 -.37).1 Defendant was 
arrested under a warrant finally issued by the county attorney's office. (R. 201:37-42). 
SUMMARY OF U^UMENT 
I. Defendant cannot claim a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights where he invited 
a confidential informant into his home and sold her marijuana. Under United States v. Hoffa, 
and State v. McArthur, defendant assumed the risk that the informant would violate his 
misplaced confidence. Here, defendant bows to the trial court's finding that he consented 
to the confidential informant's entry into his home. 
1
 Nevertheless, Jamie did spend six months in the Iron County Jail almost 
immediately after this incident and she did lose guardianship of her child. (R. 201:17-18). 
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II. The trial court did not err in refusing to conclude that defendant was not entrapped as 
a matter of law where defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing merely contradicted 
that of the confidential informant. The confidential informant testified that she spoke to 
defendant only twice before he later sold her marijuana. When finally asked, he immediately 
sold her the contraband. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant essentially makes two claims on appeal: first, that the entry of a 
confidential informant he invited into his home violated the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement, Aplt. Br. at 2-3, 18; and second, that he was entrapped as a matter of law into 
selling marijuana to a confidential informant. Aplt. Br. at 3, 32.2 The first claim has been 
settled to the contrary for forty years by United States Supreme Court precedent. The second 
claim fails under the facts of this case. 
2
 Defendant insists, based on State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 78 P.3d 590 and State 
v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, that this Court needs to establish statewide 
standards regarding the use and monitoring of confidential informants outside the time 
involved in making controlled buys, see Aplt. Br. at 12-14, 17-18, 20-26, 28, 31, 37, 40-
41. Defendant misunderstands the meaning of Warren and Hansen. The issue of 
statewide standards in those cases went to the rationale for appellate courts to afford little 
deference to trial courts in reviewing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. See 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 12, Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 26. Defendant cites to no authority 
suggesting a conflict in the current standard of review in Fourth Amendment or 
entrapment cases; neither does he provide legal authority or factual support for his bald 
assertion that different standards apply in different counties. Aplt. Br. at 26. As to the 
consideration of circumstances outside controlled buys in entrapment cases, Utah cases 
consistently take into account friendships, prior experience, and other factors. See section III, 
infra. 
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I. A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S INVITED ENTRY INTO 
DEFENDANT'S HOME DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
Defendant claims, in essence, that p< ilice use of confidential informants who enter 
residences is a "per se Fourth Amendment violation" that "is not recognized as one of the 
established and well delineated exceptions [to the warrant requirement]" and "allow[s] [CIs] 
to enter residence[s] under false pretenses." Aplt. Br. at 14-15, 22-23.3 This 
argument fails because it contradicts controlling United States Supreme Court pteeeden!. 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
A. Argument and the trial court's ruling. 
Defendant argued that because the task force had not corroborated information 
obtained through the confidential informant about defendant's illegal drug activity before she 
entered his apartment—information that would have been necessary to support a 
warrant—the confidential informant's entry violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. (R. 45-42; 201 73-75). Entry under those circumstances, 
he argued, was not "permissive." (R. 201:74). He further argued that if the court denied his 
3
 In making this claim, defendant argues that the trial court erred in not finding 
that Jamie was acting as a government agent, Aplt. Br. at 2, but later asserts that she was 
an "uncontrolled" "rogue agent" and that "the analysis on [sic] agency misdirects the 
focus on the problem" and "makes a mockery of fundamental protections." Aplt. Br. at 
18, 20-21 (boldface, underlining, and capitalization omitted). Because the Fourth 
Amendment is inapplicable to this case, a discussion of agency principles is unnecessary. 
See State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah 1991) ("It is not illegal for a private 
individual, even if acting as a government agent, to enter another's home if... she does 
so with the owner's permission. It is not necessary . . . to decide if [an informant] is an 
agent if h[er] entry into defendant's home was permissive.") (citations omitted). 
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motion to suppress based on the warrantless entry, then he should "be allowed to have the 
entrapment jury instruction given [to take] the matter to t r i a l . . . . " (R. 201.75-76). 
With regard to the entry, the prosecutor acknowledged that the confidential informant 
was arguably a government agent. (R. 201: 78, 80). However, he argued, even if Jamie was 
a government agent, her warrantless entry was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
because, under this Court's holdings in State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, 996 P.2d 555, 
cert, denied, 9 P.3 d 170, defendant permitted her to enter his apartment. (R. 201:79-81, 87). 
As to entrapment, the prosecutor argued, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim 
because the task force was not sufficiently involved: the task force had merely monitored the 
confidential informant during the controlled buy. (R. 201:76-77). In any case, given that the 
testimony going to entrapment was contradictory, the case should not be dismissed. (R. 
201:78-79). At most, defendant was entitled to an appropriate jury instruction. (R. 201:79). 
The trial court took defendant's motion to suppress under advisement. (R. 201:88-89). 
As to entrapment, the court ruled that based on "a substantial difference in the testimony with 
regard to what events occurred . . . that issue needs to be submitted to the trier of fact at the 
time of trial." (R. 201:89; see also Order Denying Motion to Suppress ("Order," R. 65-64, 
attached at Addendum B)). The court also ruled that the jury should be instruction on 
entrapment. Id. 
The court denied defendant's motion to suppress based on alleged improper entry. 
See Order (R. 65). The court found that "[although the defendant did not verbally invite the 
confidential informant into his home, he did open the door for and . . . allowed her to come 
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into his apartment. . . . She was there with his consent." See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions," R62-56, at 61-62, attached at Addendum 
C). Based nn ils review of McArthur, and State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), the court concluded as follows: 
[T]here was no violation of the Defendant's rights against unreasonable search 
and seizure since the confidential informant's entry into his residence and 
purchase of a controlled substance from him in that residence was with his 
consent. The fact that the Defendant would not knowingly have invited the 
confidential informant into his home and sell drugs to her had he known she 
was a confidential informant does not render her presence in the home illegal. 
Her hidden agenda does not change the fact that she was present in the 
Defendant's home with his consent. When one sells illegal drugs to another 
he takes . . . the risk that the person to whom he sells drugs will make public 
what has occurred... . 
(R. 56) (first ellipsis in original). 
B. The trial court correctly ruled that the Fourth Amendment was not violated. 
The trial court' conclusion was correct. In Hoffa, Jimmy Hoffa was charged with 
attempting to bribe jurors during his trial for violations of the Taft-Hartley Act. Id. at 294-95. 
The government's case relied in part on the testimony of a compensated informant who was 
present in a hotel suite when the bribery attempts were discussed. Id. at 299, 302. Hoffa 
argued that the informant's "failure to disclose his role as government informer vitiated the 
consent that the petitioner gave to [the informant's] repeated entries into the suite, and i lial 
by listening to [Hoffa's] statements, [the informant] conducted an illegal 'search' for . . . 
evidence." Id. at 300. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that this argument 
"misapprehended]... the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection." 
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Id. at 301. Hoffa had not relied on the security of his hotel suite, but rather on his "misplaced 
confidence that [the informant] would not reveal his wrongdoing." Id. at 302. The informant 
"did not enter the suite by force or stealth. He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper," but was 
there by invitation. Id. As such, Hoffa ran the "'risk of being.. . betrayed by an informer'5' 
and was not deprived of any right protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 303, quoting 
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)). 
This Court relied on Hoffa in deciding State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, 996 P.2d 
555, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). McArthur's erstwhile girlfriend agreed to help 
police obtain evidence of his involvement in a burglary. Id. at % 2. She was still welcome 
in his house, and was able to enter and obtain evidence, which she gave to a police officer. 
Id. at ffl[ 2, 6-7. The officer later used this evidence to obtain a search warrant. Id. at f^ 7. 
In affirming the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence, this Court explained: 
We do not doubt that defendant would have revoked his longstanding 
consent to [the informant's] coming and going in his . . . home if he had 
known [the informant] was cooperating with [police]. Yet, "[this] fact 
. . . does not render [the informant's] presence there illegal." The 
Constitution tolerates undercover investigations b> informants who 
conceal their status as police agents. Id. at Tf 20 (citation omitted). 
Defendant contends that Jamie could not legally enter his home because under this 
Court's decision in Statev. Koury, 824 P.2d 474,477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), "the government 
cannot use informants to do for them what they cannot legally do themselves." Aplt. Br. at 
21. As this Court explained in McArthur, however, "[t]he Fourth Amendment permits [an 
officer] to have [an informant] do whatever he could do if he were [the informant], i.e., if 
10 
had the run of the house." 2000 UT App 23, ^ 20 n.4. As in McArthur, defendant 
"welcomed [the informant] into his private sphere and candidly exposed to her the Suits of 
his illegal activity." Id. at \ 21. Similarly in this case, "[t]he risk that [Jamie] would choose 
to cooperate with authorities and reveal what she saw and heard was borne by defendant 
alone." See id. Under such circumstances, "[t]he Fourth Amendment offers no protection 
from the consequences of defendant's misplaced trust." Id. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish McArthur on the ground that the informant in that 
case had resided in the home where she obtained evidence, and had continuing permission 
to enter while she was moving out. Aplt. Br. at 34-36. This distinction is meaningless. 
Jamie was in defendant's home with defendant's consent, and defendant does not argue that 
Jamie exceeded the scope of his consent. Just as in Hoffa and McArthur, defendant here 
invited a confidential informant into his home to discuss and transact criminal activity. 
Indeed, defendant does not dispute this, admitting that he allowed Jamie into his home, sold 
her marijuana, and "gave [Jamie] th[e] impression" that he would have sold her more if he 
had it. See Aplt. Br. at 23, (R. 208:151). 
Defendant further attempts to distinguish McArthur and Koury on the grounds that in 
those cases, "the permission [to enter the home] came before the person became a CI" and 
the informants there were not participants in the illegal activity. Aplt. Br. at 35-37. These 
distinctions likewise fail to aid defendant. Regarding the timing, it is of no moment whether 
an informant contacts police before, during, or after observing illegal activity. The issue is 
whether she had permission to be in the home where the illegal activity took place. 
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Defendant does not dispute that she had permission to be in his home. See Aplt. Br. at 23 
(admitting that events in this case constituted a "permissive circumstance"). Regarding 
participation, defendant cites to no case, and the State could find none, in which this 
distinction made a difference for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
In summary, defendant's conduct ;"operate[d] to neutralize his protected interest [in 
his home].'" McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, ^  18 (citation omitted). Because he knowingly 
exposed his illegal activity to Jamie, that activity "is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection," id (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE OF 
ENTRAPMENT TO THE JURY, WHERE THE EVIDENCE 
CONFLICTED REGARDING THE NATURE OF JAMIE ODEN'S 
REQUESTS TO BUY MARIJUANA FROM DEFENDANT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in not finding entrapment as a matter of law 
and in submitting the issue to the jury. Aplt. Br. at 3, 32-34.4 This claim fails because the 
trial court properly left factual disputes to the jury to resolve regarding the kind and degree 
of pressure put on defendant to sell marijuana to Jamie Oden. When "room for dispute 
exists/' an issue is "not sufficiently clear to rule as a matter of law," and should be 
"submitted] . . . to the jury." State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See 
also State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187,1207 (Utah, 1984) (recognizing that because"[i]t is not our 
province to measure conflicting evidence,... [inconsistencies in the testimony... were for 
4
 Defendant also argues for a per se entrapment rule. Aplt. Br. at 32. However, as 
this Court stated in State v. Beddoes, "Utah has never recognized a per se rule of 
entrapment" because such cases are "very fact-sensitive." 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
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the jury to resolve") (citations omitted). 
When defendant asked the trial court to find entrapment as a matter of law at the 
suppression hearing, he had testified: 
• Denying ever selling Jamie marijuana before, though he had given it to 
her for personal consumption on five occasions. (R. 201:49, 57-58). 
• He did not want anything to do with Jamie. (R. 201:50). Their friendship 
at that point was entirely "social." (R. 201:53). 
• Jamie asked as many as six times over the course of "several weeks," 
to buy marijuana from him and was following him around. She had 
"begged" him for it ("Please, please, please, I'm desperate"), had an 
"expression of exasperation," and claimed she could not concentrate 
or sleep. (R. 201:60-61). All of this bothered, frustrated, and angered 
him; he felt harassed. (R. 201:49-50, 52). 
• He bought marijuana for Jamie and agreed to sell it to her because he 
wanted to "avoid violence." (R. 201:59, 60). He did not feel threatened, 
but did it to be "compassionate" and "nice." (R. 201:60). He thought it 
would help her to calm down during withdrawals from methamphetamine. 
(R. 201:60-61). 
The State submitted the following evidence that defendant was not entrapped: 
• Jamie knew defendant would sell her marijuana because he "always" had it. 
She had purchased it from him before. (R. 201:19-20, 69). 
• Jamie and defendant were "[acquaintances" with a "social" relationship. 
(R.201:8). 
• Jamie had seen defendant only twice in the two weeks preceding 
the transaction (R. 201:67). 
• Jamie did not beg or threaten defendant. (R. 201:68). She merely "went 
to his house and asked" for marijuana; he "thought for a second, and then 
he said, 'Yeah,'" and then sold it to her. (R. 201:11, 21, 23). 
Defendant's and the State's evidence as presented at the suppression hearing differed 
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in material ways. Defendant claimed that Jamie pestered and begged him to sell her 
marijuana, and that he gave in out of a sense of compassion. Jamie testified that she did not 
beg, but merely asked defendant for marijuana. It is reasonable to infer from this testimony 
that Jamie made no appeals to friendship, compassion, or sympathy. Defendant claimed that 
he never sold marijuana to her before. Jamie testified that he had. Given these 
inconsistencies in the evidence, the trial court properly determined that "there[] [was] a 
substantial difference in the testimony with regard to what events occurred which the 
defendant claims constitute entrapment" (R. 201:89) and rightly submitted the issue to the 
jury.5 See Pierce, 782 P.2d at 196. 
5
 To the extent that defendant claims error in the content of the entrapment 
instruction, Aplt. Br. at 9, 33-34, 39-40, the Court should decline to consider the claim. 
Defendant not only did not object to the entrapment instruction, but also requested the 
instruction ultimately submitted to the jury, verbatim. (R. 109, 133; R. 208:153). See 
State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ f 9, 86 P.3d 742 ("[A] jury instruction may not be 
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice ' if counsel, either 
by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection 
to the jury instruction.'") (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70 P.3d 111). 
Similarly, the court need not consider defendant's cursory claim that there was 
insufficient evidence at trial to submit the case to the jury. Aplt. Br. at 3, 38. Defendant 
did not preserve his claim by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, either at the 
close of the State's case-in-chief or at the close of evidence. (R. 208:139, 153). In fact, 
he conceded that the prosecution had established a prima facie case. (R. 208:138). 
Further, he does not argue on appeal that the trial court committed plain error in 
submitting the case to the jury. (R. 109, 133). See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,ffi[ 15-17 
&n. 5,10P.3d346. (holding that a defendant who fails to preserve his insufficient 
evidence claim below may only raise the claim on appeal if he demonstrates that plain 
error occurred or exceptional circumstances exist.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^day of December, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General. 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A m e n d m e n t IV. Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 2 - 3 0 3 . Entrapment 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an 
offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threaten-
ing bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is 
based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor 
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on 
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant 
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at 
least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a 
later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall 
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial. 
Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be 
appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is 
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a 
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for 
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment 
may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-2-303; Laws 1998, c. 282, § 67, eff. May 4, 1998. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GREGORY L PRESTWICH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 041500498 
JUDGE: G. MICHAEL WESTFALL 
The above entitled matter came before the court for hearing on February 28, 2005, pursuant 
to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Defendant was present in person and represented by 
his counsel of record, J. Bryan Jackson. The State was represented by Scott F. Garrett, Iron 
County Attorney. Defendant advised counsel for the State and the court that he also was seeking 
dismissal of the matter based on a defense of entrapment or, in the alternative, that the jury at trial 
should be instructed on the defense of entrapment. Witnesses were sworn and testified. At the 
conclusion of the testimony and the parties' presentation of closing argument the court directed 
that, in the event this matter does go to a jury trial, the jury should be instructed on the issue of 
entrapment. The court declined the Defendant's request that any other relief be granted with 
regard to the issue of entrapment. That issue shall be presented to the jury if Defendant so desires 
at trial. 
The court granted the parties until March 11, 2005, to submit any additional memoranda or 
legal authority in support of their respective positions regarding the Motion to Suppress. Neither 
counsel has submitted any additional legal authority in support of their respective positions and, 
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therefore, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is deemed submitted to the court for ruling as of 
March 11, 2005. 
Following the hearing the Court made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Based thereon, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed on November 24, 2004, as a "Joinder on Motion 
to Suppress or Limit" is denied. 
Dated this i T ~ day of /P&fy _, 2005. 
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Addendum C 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GREGORY L PRESTWICH, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 041500498 
JUDGE: G. MICHAEL WESTFALL 
The above entitled matter came before the court for hearing on February 28, 2005, pursuant 
to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Defendant was present in person and represented by 
his counsel of record, J. Bryan Jackson. The State was represented by Scott F. Garrett, Iron 
County Attorney. Defendant advised counsel for the State and the court that he also was seeking 
dismissal of the matter based on a defense of entrapment or, in the alternative, that the jury at trial 
should be instructed on the defense of entrapment. Witnesses were sworn and testified. At the 
conclusion of the testimony and the parties' presentation of closing argument the court directed 
that, in the event this matter does go to a jury trial, the jury should be instructed on the issue of 
entrapment. The court declined the Defendant's request that any other relief be granted with 
regard to the issue of entrapment. That issue shall be presented to the jury if Defendant so desires 
at trial. 
The court granted the parties until March 11, 2005, to submit any additional memoranda or 
legal authority in support of their respective positions regarding the Motion to Suppress. Neither 
counsel has submitted any additional legal authority in support of their respective positions and, 
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therefore, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is deemed submitted to the court for ruling as of 
March 11,2005. 
Based on the evidence presented with regard to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, and for 
purposes of the Motion to Suppress, the Court makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The State's confidential informant, Jamie Oden, was on probation in June of 2004. At that 
time, a urinalysis test indicated that she had violated her probation by using a controlled 
substance. She was told that if she assisted the local drug task force in arranging and 
completing controlled buys from distributors of controlled substances that her probation would 
not be violated as a result of the dirty urinalysis test. She agreed to assist the drug task force 
by setting up and participating in controlled buys with 4-5 people. 
2. The confidential informant had previously acquired controlled substances from the Defendant. 
On July 14, 2004, she contacted Agent Tony Gower of the Drug Task Force. During that 
conversation with Tony Gower she indicated that she could purchase controlled substances 
from the Defendant. Prior to that date the Defendant was not a target of any investigation by 
law enforcement, so far as Mr. Gower was aware. 
3. On July 14,2004, after the confidential informant informed Mr. Gower that she could purchase 
drugs from the Defendant, a controlled buy was arranged. 
4. The confidential informant met with the representatives of the drug task force, including Agent 
Gower, at a parking lot where she was wired and provided some drug task force money. She 
went to the Defendant's home and asked if she could purchase marijuana from him. 
5. Although the Defendant did not verbally invite the confidential informant into his home, he did 
open the door for her and, knowing that her intention in being there was to purchase 
marijuana, he allowed her to come into his apartment. The Defendant did not tell the 
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confidential informant to leave after she had entered and he closed the door behind her. She 
was there with his consent. 
6. The confidential informant did not disclose that she was serving as a confidential informant 
with the drug task force. 
7. The confidential informant purchased a controlled substance from the Defendant while in his 
residence. Only she and the Defendant were present in the apartment at the time. When she 
picked up the controlled substance it had already been weighed out; the Defendant did not 
weigh it out in front of her. 
8. After the buy the confidential informant left the Defendant's residence. She went directly to 
the drug task force agents who were across the street and they drove her to a parking lot 
where they searched her, took the drugs which she had purchased, and took her home. 
9. Prior to and while the transaction occurred the drug task force officers conducted surveillance. 
They watched the confidential informant go into the Defendant's apartment and they listened 
to the conversation with the assistance of the transmitter carried on the confidential informant's 
person. They did not see the Defendant, nor did they go into the residence. 
10. The representatives of the drug task force did not obtain a search warrant prior to the 
controlled buy. 
11. The confidential informant made no threats to the Defendant in order to induce him to sell the 
controlled substance to her. He was not frightened of her. According to the Defendant, he 
sold her the marijuana in order to be "nice." 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Counsel for both parties appear to agree that the controlling legal authority regarding the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is found in State v. Kourv, 824 P2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) and 
State v. McArthur, 996 P2d 555 (Utah App. 2000). This Court agrees. 
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In the McArthur case the Defendant's former live in girlfriend was arrested for forging checks 
stolen in a burglary. When questioned by law enforcement, she indicated that she was willing to 
divulge what she knew about the burglary and subsequently had several meetings with the 
investigating officer. She described the burglary to the investigating officer in detail, including 
providing descriptions of items taken, some of which were very unique. The items described by 
the former girlfriend matched items reported stolen by the victim of the burglary. Several other 
details provided by the former girlfriend were corroborated by information obtained by the 
investigating officer from other sources. The former girlfriend offered to pick up some of the items 
from the defendant's residence when she returned to retrieve some of her personal belongings. 
In response the investigating officer said, "That would be great." The investigating officer drove 
the former girlfriend to the residence and waited outside while she went inside. She tried to enter 
the front door but, finding it locked, walked around to the east side of the house where she 
disappeared from the investigating officer's view. She appeared five or ten minutes later with a 
large plastic storage bin full of her own clothing, papers and notebooks. She also had the items 
she had indicated she intended to retrieve from the defendant's residence, which had been stolen 
in the burglary. She reported to the investigating officer that she had entered through another door 
but did not report whether she had been invited in or had simply walked through an unlocked door. 
Both the defendant and his niece were home at the time. 
Based on the evidence obtained the investigating officer prepared an affidavit in support of a 
search warrant and a search warrant was issued. While the search warrant was being executed 
many of the stolen items were recovered, including a Rolex watch and a Dunhill cigarette lighter. 
A motion to suppress was filed and denied. On appeal the defendant argued that when the former 
girlfriend entered his home and retrieved the stolen knife and ashtray her actions constituted an 
illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United State's Constitution. 
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While acknowledging that the extent of the investigating officer's involvement in the former 
girlfriend's investigatory activities fell within a "gray area between the extremes of overt 
governmental participation in a search and the complete absence thereof." McArthur, 996 P2d at 
560, the Court of Appeals concluded that, even if the former girlfriend were considered to be a 
"police agent" there was no fourth amendment violation because the former girlfriend was in the 
defendant's home with the permission of an occupant of the home and "did not exceed the scope 
of that permission." Id. at 560. In reaching that conclusion the Court made the following comments, 
which are appropriate to the matter pending before this court: 
Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the 
Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom 
he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it ... The risk of being 
overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the 
identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human 
society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak. Id. at 
561, quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) at 302-03. 
The Court of Appeals went on to state 
Hoffa established that the Fourth Amendment is not offended when a defendant's 
statements, gleaned during covert investigations conducted by those believed to 
be loyal friends, are used by the authorities to pursue a criminal prosecution. 
Constitutional jurisprudence has embraced the notion that 'when one man speaks 
to another he takes ... the risk that the man to whom he speaks will make public 
what he has heard.' McArthur, 996 P2d at 561, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
US 347, 363(1967). 
The defendant in the McArthur case, like the defendant in this case, would likely not have 
consented to the informant's coming into his residence if he had known the informant was 
cooperating with the police. In acknowledging that fact the Appellate Court noted: 
[T]he fact that [defendant] would not knowingly have invited a police agent to share 
his house does not render [the informant's] presence there illegal. (Citations 
omitted) The Constitution tolerates undercover investigations by informants who 
conceal their status as police agents (Citations omitted). Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, [the informant's] hidden agenda does not render her presence in 
Defendant's home illegal. (Citations omitted) [A] privacy interest, in the constitutional 
lexicon, consists of a reasonable expectation that uninvited and unauthorized 
persons will not intrude into a particular area [emphasis in original] (Citations 
omitted) It follows that the Fourth Amendment has no application to the actions of 
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invited and authorized persons, even when, unbeknownst to the unwary, they are 
acting as police agents. (Citations omitted) ... The choice of [defendant] to open 
[his] otherwise private areas to the view of an undercover informant can be thus 
viewed as creating an area outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 
(Citations omitted) Id. at 561-562. 
The rational and decision in the McArthur case is very similar to the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision in the Kourv case. In that case the informant entered into the defendant's house to care 
for the defendant's pet, at the defendant's request, while the defendant was out of town. The 
informant had a key to the house and checked on the pets one or twice each month for about a 
year. One time while in the house the informant saw what appeared to be cocaine residue on one 
of the dressers. He gathered some of it, put it in a film cannister, and gave it to law enforcement. 
Law enforcement then began an investigation of the defendant, including checking for a criminal 
history and beginning surveillance on the defendant's house. The informant did not know of the 
investigation. Through his investigation the law enforcement officer investigating the matter 
learned that the defendant associated with individuals known to be involved with illegal drugs and 
obtained an order to install a pen register on the defendant's telephone. The investigating officer 
discovered the defendant used the telephone to contact individuals whom the officer believed to 
be dealing drugs. An affidavit was prepared based on information that the informant had provided 
and the officer's own investigation and a search warrant was obtained for the defendant's house 
and car. As a result of the search the officer seized straws, a set of scales and weights and other 
paraphernalia as well as items with what appeared to be cocaine residue on them. The defendant 
filed a motion to suppress. That motion was denied. On appeal the defendant claimed that the 
officers had violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, among 
other things, the informant was acting as a government agent and therefore illegally entered and 
searched the defendant's home. In disposing of that argument and affirming the conviction the 
Court of Appeals discussed the standard for establishing an agency relationship as set forth in 
State v. Watts, 750 P2d 1219 (Utah 1988). However, the Court concluded that, even if the private 
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individual were acting as a government agent, "[i]t is not illegal for a private individual... to enter 
another's home if he or she does so with the owner's permission." Kourv, 824 P2d at 478 (Citations 
omitted). 
In discussing the Koury case, the Court of Appeals in McArthur commented: "The risk that [the 
informant] would choose to cooperate with authorities and reveal what she saw and heard was born 
by defendant alone. The Fourth Amendment offers no protection from the consequences of 
defendant's misplaced trust." McArthur, 996 P2d at 562 (Citations omitted). 
Based on the Utah Court of Appeals cases cited hereinabove, this Court concludes that there 
was no violation of the Defendant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure since the 
confidential informant's entry into his residence and purchase of a controlled substance from him 
in that residence was with his consent. The fact that the Defendant would not knowingly have 
invited the confidential informant into his home and sell drugs to her had he known she was a 
confidential informant does not render her presence in his home illegal. Her hidden agenda does 
not change the fact that she was present in the Defendant's home with his consent. When one 
sells illegal drugs to another he takes ... the risk that the person to whom he sells drugs will make 
public what has occurred, to paraphrase the above referenced quote from the Katz case. 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress should 
be denied. 
Dated this ^ day of , 2005. 
